Global ocean governance is a historical product. In the course of development
hand, China has tried to create a new multilateral system to realize its national interests, such as the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, BRICS Bank, etc.
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I. Introduction
China is not a country with a favorable marine geography. However, it is a burgeoning state with huge marine capacity with the third largest shipping fleet and the largest shipbuilding caliber in the world.
2 As a leading maritime power, China has a real need for global ocean governance reform. 3 This will help China protect its maritime interests and improve its influence in the global ocean governance.
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A study on the historical evolution of the global ocean governance system and its contemporary condition is indispensable for today's China. This research is to sum up China's lessons from history in establishing a global ocean governance system and to explore the ways of China's active participation in the reform process. This paper is composed of five parts including this Introduction and a Conclusion. Part two will criticize the contemporary global ocean governance system, scrutinize main challenges and development trends, and suggest improvements. Part three will review China's participation in the global ocean governance reform. Part four will illustrate China's institutional design for the reform. The 18th CPC National Congress clearly reported that China should "improve the capacity of marine resources development, develop the marine economy, protect the marine ecological environment, firmly safeguard the national marine rights and interests, and build a powerful marine power." See JintAo hu, unSwervingly Follow the pAth oF SoCiAliSm with ChineSe ChArACteriStiCS And Strive For A moderAtely proSperouS SoCiety in All reSpeCtS 40 (People's Publishing House, 2012).
In the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the resolution pointed out that "strengthening foreign-related legal affairs" will require China to "... actively participate in the making of international rules and regulations, and to promote the handling of foreign economic and social affairs according to law, strengthen our State's power of discourse and influence in international legal affairs, and to safeguard the sovereignty, security and development interests of our country by legal means."
II. Legal Problems in Contemporary Global Ocean Governance: Main Defects and Reformation
With its inception in 1945, the UN began to build an ocean governance system for the post-war world. It convened three conferences on the law of the sea from 1958 to 1982. This process established the contemporary global ocean governance system through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") in 1982 
A. The Main Defects of the Contemporary System
The UNCLOS was signed as a result of struggle and compromise among different maritime interest groups of the international community. It reflected the common concerns and aspirations of all parties in the conferences. 6 Nonetheless, the contemporary global ocean governance system has many defects.
Blurred rules
First, many rules of the UNCLOS and other relevant provisions are set in lawmaking treaties. Compared with contractual treaties whose regulations are stipulated in a more detailed fashion, the provisions of law-making treaties are general and ambiguous. It often leads parties to controversies due to differing interpretation. In fact, the UNCLOS fails to explicitly stipulate historical rights of maritime areas and features such as islands and reefs. For example, Articles 10, 15 and 298 of the UNCLOS do not clearly define 'historic bay,' 'historical waters,' or 'historic title.' Further, Article 121 (Part VIII) deals specifically with the "Regime of Islands," but fails to clear the cloud over the definition of either 'islands' or 'reefs,' let alone specific criteria for "maintaining human habitation or its own economic life. Second, many provisions of law-making treaties are the result of a package deal in which vague and general provisions are employed in order to get all parties to agree and to balance competing interests. At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, for example, many countries agreed that foreign warships and military aircraft could pass through straits belonging to coastal states, but these rights were conditioned on agreement with the system of exploration and exploitation in the Area of the UNCLOS (i.e., the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction), as laid down in Part XI of the UNCLOS. of whose functions overlap. In the area of marine environmental management, for instance, the International Seabed Authority ("ISA") published a "Discussion Paper on the Development and Drafting of Regulations on Exploitation for Mineral Resources in the Area (Environmental Matters)" (hereinafter Draft Environmental Regulation) in January 2017. 18 This paper defines the environmental impact assessments of the "international seabed area," "environmental protection planning," "environmental planning review," and "remedial and punitive measures" in detail. 19 As the ISA and the Chamber of the ITLOS both involve in handling marine environmental issues, the de facto overlapping of their functions shall pose a challenge for future disputesettlement.
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Fragmentation of the governance mechanism has led to some loopholes. For example, the UNCLOS divides the sea areas, according to geographic elements, into seven types such as internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, continental shelf, high seas, and international seabed areas and stipulates different legal systems for each. This fragmentation of management modes will inevitably create a vacuum in management content.
B. Main Challenges and Development Trends
Emerging fields and problems in global ocean governance
The conservation and use of biodiversity in waters beyond the national jurisdiction is a point of contention in the international community. In June 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 69/292 to initiate international negotiation on the conservation and sustainable use of "marine biological diversity of areas beyond the national jurisdiction."
21 Resolution 69/292 proposed a roadmap in three steps:
(1) establishment of a preparatory committee; (2) an intergovernmental conference to start the formal negotiation process; and (3) introduction of an international agreement on the subject.
22
In July 2017, the fourth meeting of the preparatory committee submitted the final proposal (draft) to the General Assembly. 23 The draft aims to define the overall objectives and main contents of "marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction." 24 For this purpose, it should redefine the proprietary nature of marine biological resources which impacts the "principle of freedom of the high seas" and The draft also indicates that new rules and systems for global ocean governance are in consideration. 26 As another example, current international seabed activities have reached a historic turning point -from exploration to the preparation for exploration and development.
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As large-scale commercial development of the international seabed is underway, it is imperative to formulate an 'Exploitation Code' to establish a framework for the future development of mining areas. For this purpose, the ISA promulgated the "Working Draft Regulations and Standard Contract Terms on Exploitation for Mineral Resources in the Area" (hereinafter Draft Exploitation Regulations) in July 2016 28 and then released the above mentioned Draft Environmental Regulations in January 2017. 29 Inasmuch as having great differences of interest in the "exploitation regulations" and "environmental regulations," the stakeholders cannot reach consensus on the three core issues, namely, charge, environmental protection, and confidentiality of information. It will take time to adopt an Exploitation Code. A major challenge for the ISA is to formulate a scientific, fair, and equitable Exploitation Code for international seabed regional resources. This is another problem that global ocean governance must face today.
Nontraditional security
On the one hand, maritime terrorism is becoming more serious than before. 30 The
Islamic State, despite its decline in Iraq and Syria threatens to carry out terrorist operations wherever it finds an opportunity, which may be transferred to the sea. On the other hand, the impact of climate change on global ocean governance is attracting more attention from the international community. 
Maritime questions
The principle of freedom of navigation involves not only public legal questions, such as the innocent passage of a state's warship in another state's territorial sea or activities in another state's EEZ, but also private ones, such as the international carriage of goods by sea. Freedom and safety of navigation are in accordance with combating terrorism and piracy at sea. It is also closely related to establishing and constructing offshore oil and gas drilling platforms, which affect the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exploitation of resources in deep seabed. The question of marine environmental protection runs through the whole process. 
C. Perfection of the Contemporary System
As mentioned earlier, the contemporary global ocean governance system is based on the UNCLOS, which is regarded as the "Constitution for the Oceans." This, however, makes it hard to solve the newly arising ocean problems in a brand new and innovative manner. It is thus necessary to improve the existing system at both international and regional levels. Therefore, in accordance with Articles 312 and 313 of the UNCLOS, a review mechanism of the UNCLOS should be established and improved. 38 Another example is the Exploitation Code, which is under promotion by the ISA. It will further improve the global ocean governance system. 39 Today, the international seabed activities are turning from exploration to development. As large-scale commercial development of the international seabed become feasible, developing the Exploitation Code and building an institutional framework for future mining are important task for the ISA in the next few years. The new regime on the development of resource of international seabed will further improve the global ocean governance system. Finally, relevant international organizations should be guided to improve the system. Maribel Aguilos suggested that in view of the complexity of the global ocean governance and the important role of the UN, the UN Charter should be modified to upgrade "global ocean governance" to the same status as the other purposes of the UN, such as "to maintain international peace and security." 40 
Regional level
In 2004, 16 Asian states concluded the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia ("ReCAAP"), 41 which specifically defines "armed robbery against ships." 42 ReCAAP applies not only to piracy on the high seas or in an EEZ, but also to 'armed robbery' in territorial waters, archipelago waters, and straits used for international navigation. Consequently, ReCAAP filled gaps in the UNCLOS 43 and improved the global ocean governance system.
III. China's Participation in the Global Ocean Governance Reform: Its Experiences and Lessons
A. China's Basic Principles in Ocean Policy
By participating in the global ocean governance reform process, China has formulated principles in ocean policy. First, China has consistently defended its maritime rights in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality, noninterference in another nation's internal affairs, and peaceful settlement of international disputes. 44 In addition, China has also respected the basic principle of international law of the sea in resolving territorial sea disputes and maritime delimitation issues through direct negotiation and consultation with the parties concerned. 45 Second, along with China's participation in the global ocean governance reform, its domestic maritime law system has gradually improved. Since the 1980s, China has adopted a series of decrees, ordinances, regulations, and rules concerning territorial seas, EEZs, continental shelf, straits, port management, ship management, prevention of marine pollution, and protection of aquatic resources. 46 In particular, China ratified the UNCLOS in 1996, which helped China adapt to the contemporary global ocean governance system and safeguard its maritime interests more effectively under international law. It has made a wide and far-reaching influence on China's marine legislation, ocean policy and commerce. All these not only contribute to the implementation of China's marine strategy, but also facilitate its further participation in the global ocean governance reform.
B. Lessons from China's Participation
China has so far been a passive recipient of international rules in ocean governance "perform[ing] fairly well." Actually, "new rules initiated by China are very few." 49 Take the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea as an example. China's played little role in setting the agenda. It did not put forward proposals, but supported demands of most developing countries. 50 In the process of drafting the convention, China was not arguing its legal position enough mainly because there were few ocean law experts. 51 The number of ocean law experts in the Chinese delegation was smaller than those of medium-sized countries such as Denmark and Switzerland. They were even unfamiliar with the procedural rules of the conference. 52 Although the Chinese delegation participated in all the sessions from the beginning to the end, the delegates failed to showcase a Chinese brand to the global ocean governance forum. 53 John Ikenberry said that emerging powers like China did not experiences in building a global order, so that they could not put forward a viable alternative model. 54 Due to the low profile participation in establishing and reforming the global ocean governance system, China could not actively defend its maritime rights. China has so far stood on the side of the developing countries and unilaterally supported their positions on an ideological ground. Today, however, China should consider its own maritime rights and interests more than an ideological principle.
Shizhong Done has pointed out:
This is the first time that my delegation has attended a large-scale multilateral lawmaking conference like the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. However, as a socialist country with a billion people who has always stood on the side of the Third World countries, our principled position on the main issues of the law of the sea is a huge boost in developing countries.
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China has now become an active participant and contributor to international seabed affairs. Chinese entities have long been 'pioneer investors' in polymetallic nodule resources in the international seabed and obtained four exclusive exploration areas therein. 56 Given the current situation, conventional positions backing up developing countries would not be always in line with China's national interests today. Further, China has firmly supported the EEZ system advocated by developing countries such as Latin America and Africa. However, China is a country with an unfavorable marine geography. In this case, the EEZ system put forward by developing countries would not always do good to China, who has newly expanded ocean use. To sum up, China's ideological position is neither entirely in line with its national footing, nor conducive to the protection of ocean rights and interests. 57 Finally, China should strike balance between its national interests (short-term and long-term) and the global ocean governance rules, because some of the global rules could prevent the implementation of its ocean policy and law. For example, there has been a controversy in international law as to whether warships enjoy a right of innocent passage through territorial seas. 58 Practices would vary from country to country. At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, there were obvious differences between the major maritime powers such as the US and the then Soviet Union, and the developing countries including China. Traditionally, China has always held that warships could not enjoy innocent passage in foreign territorial seas. 59 However, Lihai Zhao maintained a different position: He said: "…, according to the principle of reciprocity, requiring foreign warships to pass through the territorial sea with prior consent, may not be beneficial to our country." 60 As for the innocent passage of warship in other country's territorial sea, China has maintained two different positions. One is to give priority to military security based on the unforgettable humiliation of 'gunboat diplomacy,' 61 while the other is to consider the national strategy for building a marine power. If foreign warships enjoy the right of innocent passage through China's territorial waters, Chinese navy can go global more easily, thereby safeguarding China's expanding maritime rights and interests more efficiently.
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Given the recent situation, traditional approach to the warship's innocent passage through other country's territorial water (consent of or prior notice to other country) could be inconsistent with the national stance of China to be a global ocean power. 63 The resources in the EEZ is another question. With the rapid development of pelagic fishery in the 21st century, 64 Chinese fishing boats and fishermen have been often detained by other countries, which used to make fishery disputes with Indonesia, Korea, etc. 65 It can be seen that China's e claims are in conflict with its long-term interests.
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Regarding the deep seabed area, China advocates that only the ISA can develop and manage resources there. Such single development system may obviously pose a constraint to the country in the development of international seabed resources. Under the current position, China is not qualified to participate in the development, let alone be the 'pioneer investor' with the largest number of mining areas.
In conclusion, China lacks strategic thinking on the long-term interests in establishing and reforming the ocean governance system. It should recognize that some rules could shackle China's ocean development itself.
The ocean is the fundamental ground for China's future development. In May 2017, China hosted the first Annual Meeting of the States Parties to the 'Antarctic Treaty,' which indicated the influential role of China in global ocean governance from a 'runner-up' to a 'pacemaker.'
69 Today, China's marine interests have expanded from the original geographic aspect to the international institutional level.
B. China is a Newly Invigorated Player!
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The institutional design of China's participation in the global ocean governance reform includes the following two aspects. One is to launch a World Ocean Organization and the other is to transform the global ocean governance system.
World Ocean Organization
As there are specific international organizations to lead the current global ocean governance system, China could launch the World Ocean Organization ("WOO"). First, the WOO can address fragmentation of the current governance mechanism 71 and achieve the goal of "good governance of the oceans." 72 Second, the WOO will be the steppingstone of China's participation in transforming the global ocean governance system. 73 It would be beneficial to share China's ideas with its allies. 74 The WOO aims to build a 'harmonious ocean' and to realize sustainable development of ocean use. It would reflect the typical three-tier structure. 75 First, the General Assembly is the supreme organ of the WOO, composed of government representatives from member states. It has the authority to formulate policies, adopt budgets, conduct elections, make recommendations, and supervise implementation. 76 the resolutions of the General Assembly and putting forward work measures. 77 Third, the Secretariat is responsible for the administration of the organization. It can set up special offices regarding Marine Safety, Marine Resources Development, Marine Environmental Protection, and Marine Sustainable Development.
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The WOO may have two voting systems: the majority vote and consensus. Guoqing Jiang defines 'consensus' as "an informal practice of reaching a general agreement without voting on the basis of extensive consultation among member States, when formal voting rules are unsatisfactory or effective decisions cannot be made on the basis of them." 79 The General Assembly could adopt a consensus decision-making process.
Micro-level paths
The micro-level path of China's participation in the global ocean governance system reform can include the following steps. First, in international treaty-making over the years, China only played the role of a contestant. 80 In the future, however, China
should not only participate in the formulation of rules, but also actively promote its own position into each issue. Second, in drafting treaties, China should maintain high morality respecting global common good. "Care for others and benefit myself" is the best way to strike the balance between national interests and the mutual concern of the international community. Finally, China should coordinate different interests of the international community. In addition to developing countries, China should make joint progress with developed countries in dealing with the reform process.
In the development of deep seabed or the maintenance of freedom of navigation, for example, China has common interests with the US, Russia, Japan, France, and Germany, because they all demand the Exploitation Code to protect the interests of all pioneer investors and exploration contractors for the development of resource of the Area. China is one of the few countries able to formulate international customs of ocean 83 They are important ground to safeguard China's maritime rights and to form international customary rules concerning the global ocean governance system. Although China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has been passive in international rule-making. 84 As international organizations have been playing an active role in ocean governance, China should work with intergovernmental organizations for the reform. In particular, China should be familiar with the procedures of international judicial institutions. In addition, NGOs are actively transforming the global ocean governance system. 85 NGOs have been recognized in the negotiation process of the UNCLOS and the International Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity beyond National Jurisdiction. 86 In the international community, NGOs would diversify the value of lawmaking process. 87 Hence, China's NGOs should participate in international legislations. They are required to make a joint effort with the government, which is conducive to China's in-depth participation in the reform of the global ocean governance system. China's ultimate aim is to further enhance its voice in the future reform of global ocean governance.
V. Conclusion
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye point out:
Maritime issues are determined by naval forces or capabilities, as well as by egalitarian organizational procedures and confrontations between rich and poor countries. Oceans issues were determined as much by egalitarian organizational procedures and by confrontation between rich and poor nations as by naval power or oceans capabilities.
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While reviewing the development process of global ocean governance, we discover that hegemonic powers have been always in a dominant position in its establishment and reform. For example, the US has explicitly stated in "An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century" that "the United States uses its domestic management experience as an example of global Ocean governance." 89 In the "International Ocean Governance: An
Agenda for the Future of Our Oceans," the EU has also positioned itself as "a strong global actor" trying to shape a governance model based on its experience. 90 As China is a late-comer in global ocean governance, it had a limited role in reformation for a long period of time. It still lags in the setting of issues, discourse construction, and rule-making. There is a strong "European and American taste" in governance theoretically and practically.
Since 2013, China has tried to play a greater role in shaping and influencing it. In this regard, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech in Berlin in March 2014:
We will proceed from the righteousness of world peace and development, contribute Chinese wisdom for dealing with contemporary international relations, deliver Chinese solutions for improving global governance, and make our own contribution to the
